INDEX$
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES.
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ACTION.
See Attorney.
ACT OF ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Act of 1780-Ferry vs. Street,
Acts of 1803, 1818-Frankfort vs. Lennig,
Acts of 1843, 1849-See Judgment Confessed,
Act of 1848-Commonwealth vs. Martin,
ACT OF NEW YORK.
Act of 1849 -Bradley vs. Baxter,
ACT OF OHIO.
Act of 1850-Lawson vs. The Bank,
ACTS OF CONGRESS.
Acts of 1793, 1850-See Fugitive Slave,
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ACTS OF GEORGIA.
612
Acts of 1809, 1823-Prothero vs. Kendall,
ADMIRALTY.
1. A seaman who is at the same time a part owner of the vessel in
which he serves, is not thereby precluded from libelling in Admiralty for
wages.
2. A. and B. were, with others, part owners of a vessel, and also served
on board her as mariners. The vessel was sold on execution out of a State
Court, on a judgment against all the owners. Held, that the sale not
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affecting the liens of seamen, A. and B.
of the purchaser at Sheriff's sale, for
standing the former part ownership.
3. The seaman's lien for wages is
cution against the owners of a vessel.
No. 2,

.

.

.

might libel the vessel in the hands
wages due prior thereto, notwithnot discharged by a sale on exeFoster et al. vs. Steamboat Pilot,
403

....

ADVANCES.
See Co-Owners.
AGENT.
Where an agent rightfully receives money for his principal, which
ought to be paid over by the principal to a third person, such third person
cannot maintain an action against the agent for the recovery, though the
agent have never in fact paid it over to his principal, and though the agent
have notice of the claim made by such third person. Costigan vs. Newland,

.
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ALTERATION IN NOTE.
1. Where the holder of a bond or note makes an alteration in its date,
he avoids the instrument, even though the alteration was in truth the correction of a mistake, and was so intended.
2. The original action here was upon a note under seal. The plaintiff
alleged that the note was dated as of a wrong year, and altered it for the
purpose of making it conform to the truth: On the trial it was objected,
that the note was avoided by the alteration, and thereupon the plaintiff
proved that the alteration was honestly made in mere correction of a mistake, and under the instruction of the Court, (WATTs, P. J.) that this was
a sufficient answer to the objection, the plaintiff had a verdict, and judgment was entered thereon. Miller vs. Gilleland, Lowrie and Woodward,
672

J. T. disenting,

APPRENTICE.
See Constitutional Law-Acts of Congress, 1793, 1850.

Boaler vs.
6.54

Cummines,

ASSIGNMENT.
See Judgment Confessed.
1. Itisno objection to an asbignment for the benefit of creditors, stipulating a release, that the wife of a grantor does not join therein. Breitenbach vs. Dungan,

-

-

419

2. An assignment for the benefit of Creditors, made by a Debtor who has
absconded to a foreign country, carrying with him a large sum of money,
is fraudulent and void as to Creditors, if it contain a stipulation for a
release as a condition of obtaining a preference under the assignment.
3. Whether an insolvent IDebtor who disigns but a part of his property
for the benefit of all his Creditors, can ever stipulate for a release. Quere.
520
Stewart vs. Spenser,
ASSIGNS.
Meaning of, see Holbrook vs. Insurance Co.,

18
ATTORNEY.
1. An attorney employed to commence and prosecute a suit, but not otherwise authorized, has no power to settle that suit, and discharge the defend479
ant from the plaintiffs claim. Derwort vs. Loomer,
2. An attorney, who forecloses a mortgage for his client by advertisement
under the statute of New York, and on the sale receives the amounts only
which he pays over, the amount due to his client, cannot be held liable to
the person having the oldest lien on the surplus. The action in such case
must be brought againt the client, and not against the attorney. Costigan
vs. Newland,

AUTHOR.
See Editor.
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BANK NOTE.
See Statute of Limitations.
1. In an action on a bank note against the bank which issued it, payable
generally on demand, it is not necessary to aver and prove a demand, the
suit itself being a sufficient demand.
2. In case, however, of a bank note payable on demand at a particular
place, held, that a demand at the place is necessary to a suit against the
bank at the time designated, or afterwards, (if time is also specified,) and
must be averred in the declaration, aud proven on the trial; and that the
place must be stated in the note with distinctness and precision. Dougherty vs. The Western Bank of Georgia,
689
BILL IN CHANCERY.
Where a bill makes charges of fraud which are not established at the
hearing, the bill will be dismissed, notwithstanding it states other grounds
upon which relief might have been granted, if not blended with the allegations of fraud. Mount Vernon Bank vs. Stone,
339
BOARD OF WARDENS.
See Delaware River.
BILL OF EXCHANGE.
1. A holder of a bill of exchange payable at a day certain, may present
it for acceptance at any time before maturity, and upon refusal of the
drawee to accept, may give notice of such refusal to the prior parties, and
have an action against them at once.
2. If the holder omit to give notice to the drawer and endorsers, of the
refusal of the drawee to accept upon presentment, they will be discharged,
unless the bill subsequently come to the hands of a bona fide holder for
value, who again presents the bill and duly charges the prior parties.
3. To constitute a valid undertaking as an acceptance, the undertaking
must in New York be in writing, and signed by the acceptor. The writing
must indicate that the party sought to be charged as acceptor, intended to
take upon himself the obligations, and assume the liabilities of an acceptor.
4. A bill drawn by a manufacturing corporation in the country, upon an
individual in New York city, who is the treasurer and financial agent of the
company, and presented for acceptance to the drawee, who writes across
the face of the bill, " accepted, payable at American Exchange Bank," and
signs it "Clayville Mills, by E. C. Hamilton, Treasurer," (Clayville Mills
being the drawers,) is not accepted by the drawee.
6. The acceptance is that of the corporation and the endorsers, are entitled to notice of non-acceptance by the drawee, and for want of notice,
are discharged from liability to the holder of the bill. The Oneida Bank
vs. Burton D. Hurlbut.
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6. Notice of dishonor of a bill or note, where the parties reside in different places or States, must be deposited in the post office in time for the
nail of the next day, provided it be not made up and closed at an unreasonably early hour, or before early and convenient business hours.
7. Where the mail from the place of protest of a bill, to the place of
residence of the endorser, closed at ten minutes past nine, A. M., on the
day subsequent to the protest; business hours beginning at seven o'clock,;
A. M., at the former place, it was held, that notice of dishonor deposited in
the post office after such closing of the mail, was too late.
8. The holder of a bill is only bound to give notice of dishonor to his
immediate endorser; and so of an agent for collection. Lawson vs. The
Bank of Salem,

-
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9. In an Action by Payee against the Maker of the following Instrument-." Two Months after Date I promise to pay to T. R. L., or Order,
991, 15s. for value received"-in the Corner was the Name of the Plaintiff,
and his Acceptance was written across the instrument :-Held, that it
might be treated as a Bill of Exchange. Lloyd vs. Oliver,
40

INDEX.
10. A foreign attachment was levied on debts generally. The garnishees
had given to the defendant a blank bill of exchange, for a debt due him,
on which bill they had written their acceptance. Subsequently to the
attachment, the defendant filled up the blanks to his own order and endorsed the bill to a purchaser for value without notice. Held that the doctrine of ls pendens did not apply; that he endorser of the bill took a good
"
title; and that the garnishee was discharged.
11. A bill of exchange accepted, without any name of drawer or payee, is
nevertheless a regular instrument by the Law Merchant; and the holder
may, on a sale thereof, fill up the blanks for the benefit of the purchaser,
in good faith, and when so filled, the bill will stand as though so made
originally.

Haydon va.Field,

-
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BILL OF LADING.
1. Where goodi put on board a ship to be carriedby sea, forhire, under
a bill of lading which contains only the usual exception, viz., "the act of
God, the Queen's enemies, fire, and all other dangers and accidents of the
seas, rivers and navigation, &c., excepted," are damaged by rats during
the voyage, it is no defence to an action by the owner of the goods that
the master had kept cats on board.
2. Semble, it would be a defence that rats had made a hole in the ship
through which water came in and injured the goods, Lavaroni vs. Drury, 174
CARRIER.
1. Where a bill of lading contains the ,"dangers of navigation excepted,"
the carrier brings himself within tie clause, when he shows that on a dark
and stormy night, at the entraitce of a harbor difficult of access, he mistook
a light on shore in a line with the pier light, for the latter, whereby the
vessel went ashore and damaged a portion of the cargo.
2. The carrier, in order to avail himself of the benefit of this restrictive
clause, must bring his case strictly within the words of the exception, and
for this purpose the burden of proof is upon him.
3. A master may enter a harbor on a dark night, with a heavy sea and
high wind, though the access be difficult but not unusually dangerous,
without incurring the imputation of negligence. Badgely vs. The Schooner
Juniata Paton,

.

.

.

.

.

CARRIER OF PASSENGERS.
See Negligence.
1. Where the action was for injuries to the plaintiff, by the overturning of a stage coach, in which she was a passenger, resulting from the
negligence of the defendant's agent; and from the undisputed facts in the
case, the Court could see, that there was culpable negligence in the defendants agent; the defence rested, not only upon the absence of such negligence, but a settlement and discharge, by the plaintiff's attorney, whose
authority was denied; and both issues being submitted to the jury upon
the evidence, they gave a verdict for the defendant; it was held, that the
jury must have proceeded upon false notions of law, and as, in the opinion
of the Court, the verdict was against the evidence, on both grounds, a new
trial was granted.
2. In such cases, legal negligence is not a pure question of the fact for
fhe jury, but is mixed up with principles of law, so that its determination
involves a conclusion of law, or more properly, a rule of responsibility, to
be applied by the Court.
3. In the case of common carriers of passengers, the highest degree of
care, which a reasonable man would use, is required by law.
4. This rule applies alike to the character of the vehicle, the horses and
harness, the skill and sobriety of the driver, his watchfulness, and his conduct, under every emergency or difficulty.
5. The contract to carry passengers differs from that to carry freight,
only in this, that in the latter case, the carrier is responsible at all events,
except for th6 act of God and the public enemy.
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6. Public notice given by a carrier, that he will not be responsible for
freight, or that it is at the risk of the owner, will not vary the carrier's
liability.
7. Nor will the custom of stage proprietors and their drivers to load
down the vehicle with passengers and freight, to its utmost capacity,
regardless of the state of the roads, exonerate them from liability.
8. The practice of converting stage-coaches into freight wagons, to
transport iron, and almost every thing else, is an innovation upon the
rights of the travelling community, which the Court will not sanction or
479
countenance. Derwort and Wife vs. Loomer,
CASES AFFIRMED.
97
Simpson vs. Hand, 6 Whart. 311; Railway vs. Skinner,
206
Prigg vs. Pennsylvania; Moore vs. Illinois,
585
The Raikes, 1 Hagg, 246; Brooks vs. The Penn., 587
The William Beckford, 3 C. Rob., 355; Brooks vs. The Penn,
CASES APPROVED.
Downs vs. Planter's Bank, 1 Sm. & M., 261; Chick vs. Pillsbury, 24
619
Maine, 458; Lawson vs. The Bank of Salem,
87, 90
Jones vs. Shawhan, 4 W. & S., 263; Sutton vs. The Albatross,
471
Wilson vs. Rosseau, 4 How., 688; Bloomer vs. McEwen,
CASES COMMENTED ON.
605, 606
Underwood vs. Parks, 2 Stra. 1200; Follet vs. Jewett,
600
Graham vs. Stone, 6 How. Pr. Cases, 15; Follett vs. Jewett,
Doddington vs. Hallett; Pragoff vs. Heslop; Ex parte Young. Ibid.
CASES DOUBTED.
Harris vs. Seppitt, 2 Campb., 637; People vs. Genning, 11 Wend., 18, 92, 93
CASES OVERRULED.
227
Weidman vs. Marsh, 4 Harris, 504; Shriver vs. Myer,
170
Summers' Appeal, 4 Harris, 169; Hutchinson vs. McClure,
CATTLE.
See Railway.
CHARITABLE USES.
1. The peculiar jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, in England, with
regard to charitable uses, where the devise, &c., is made to no certain or
competent person, or for an object so vague as not to admit on a liberal
interpretation of being definitely ascertained, is derived from the statute
of 43 Elizabeth, and has never been adopted in New York.
2. It seems that a trust for charitable purposes, if express, is within the
538
revised statutes of New York. Chittenden vs. Chittenden,
COLLISION.
A steamer on her way to sea at night, with her signal lantern properly placed, saw a barque, without lights, heading up the river to the starboard of her wake. She accordingly starboarded her helm, to keep off the
track of the barque, but the latter, about the same time, unobserved by
the steamer, changed her course, by porting her helm, so that a collision
ensued. Hdd, that as the course and position of the steamer could be
well understood on the barque, the latter was in fault, and she was accord15
ingly condemned in damages. Palmer vs. The Osprey, CO-OWNER.
1. Co-owners of Ships and Steamboats. Their liens for sums advanced
in payment for the construction of the vessel.
2. If they unite in building the vessel for the purpose of conducting a
joint trade, in the carrying of merchandise, passengers, etc., to divide
profits and suffer losses as partners do, unless there is some controlling
circumstance, each part-owner has a lien on the ship, or steamboat, for
such advances; and will have a preference over general creditors of the
other part-owners; but not against purchasers of the other's shares, without notice. Pragoff vs. Heslep and others.
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CONSIDERATION.
Where a promissory note had been given for the purchase money, of a
diseased and worthless mare, the conduct of the holder of the note having
misled the buyer into the purchase, held, that the consideration had failed,
and no recovery could be had on the note. Cassel vs. Herron,
- 681
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
See Fugitive Slave. See Corporation.
1. A state may, by virtue of its general police power, repel from its borders an unacceptable population, whether paupers, criminals, fugitives or
liberated slaves, and may hence punish her own citizens who thwart this
policy of expulsion by assisting such fugitives.
2. The Illinois Act is not the same as the Act of Congress of February
12, 1793--section 4.
3. A man may, by the same act, commit two offences against two different sovereignties, and may hence be punished by both, but this is not a
double punishment for the same offence.
4. Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, 16 Peters, 540, commented on, and points
restated.-Moore, Executor of Ells, vs. The People of the State of Illinois,

-

-

-
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6. The citizen cannot resist by force the execution of process obtained
through the tribunals in the regular course of proceedings, although he
may consider it to have been unconstitutionally and unjustly obtained;
such forcible resistance would render him criminally liable.
6. The citizen is not.at liberty to offer the least resistance, by force, to
the execution of a law esteemed by himself to be an unauthorized and
unconstitutional one, nor may he incite others to do so, even when it acts
directly upon his own person or property.-Chief Justice Shepley's Charge
to Jury,
212
7. The clause of the Constitution of the United States, which directs the
surrender of a- fugitive from justice upon the demand of the executive
authority of the State from which he fled, contains no grant of power, but
is the mere regulation of an existing right on the part of the State making
the surrender.
8. Every sovereign state may, at its option, surrender a criminal to the
government against whose laws he has offended.
9. The United States government has never acknowledged the right of
foreign nations to demand the surrender of fugitives from justice independent of treaty stipulations.
10. A fugitive from justice from either of the United States may, under
the provision of the constitution of the United States, (Art. 4, J 2,) be
arrested and detained in this State, in order to his surrender, before a
requisition is actually made upoi 1he executive for his surrender.
11. It'is not necessary, in order to warrant the surrender or detention of
the fugitive, that the crime with which he stands charged should constitute
an offence at the common law.
12. To warrant the surrender or detention of the fugitive, it must appear
that the crime with which he stands charged was committed within the
state fromwhich he is alleged to be a fugitive.-In the Matter of William
Fetter,

A
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13. The Act of New York of March 26, 1849, commonly called "the Free
School Act," under the- provisions of which, certain district school taxes
were levied, is unconstitutional and void.
14. A legislative body ma? provide by enactment for the happening of
contingent or uncertain events, but such provision must be made to take
effect independent of any decision of an extraneous power, such as a decision at the ballot box by the people, upon the expediency of the Act itself.
15. By the theory of the New York and all other American Constitutions,
assuming a representative principle as the foundation of government, the
legislative power is vested in special bodies, which precludes any other
body from exercising the same functions by delegation.
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10. An amendment to a void law cannot make it valid.-Bradley vs. Bax-

ter,

-
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17. The clause of the Constitution and the provisions of the acts of Congress of 1793 and 1850, providing for the rendition of persons held to labor,
include apprentices.
18. Where C. had bound himself an apprentice in Delaware, with the
assent of his father, who lived in Pennsylvania, and the latter had, upon
one occasion, returned C, to his master, from whom he had absconded:
held, that C. might be arrested by virtue of a Commissioners warrant, and
remanded to his master as a fugitive.-Boaler vs. Cummines,
654
19. The 5th section of the Act of 1809 (Prince, 117), and the 8d section
of the Act of 1823 (Prince, 183), declared to be unconstitutional and void,
on the ground that they contain matter different from what is expressed in
the titles of the Acts to which they respectively belong.-Prothro vs. Orr, 612
20. The clause in constitutions which prohibits the taking of private property for public use, was not designed to operate, and it does not operate
to prohibit the legislative department from authorizing an exclusive occupation of private property temporarily, as an incipient proceeding to the
adquisition of a title to it, or an easement in it.
21. Such clause was designed to operate, and it does operate to prevent
the acquisition of any title to land, or to an easement in it, or to a permanent appropriation of it from an owner for public use, without the actual
payment or tender of a just compensation for it.
22. That the right to such temporary occupation as an incipient proceeding, will become extinct by an unreasonable delay to perfect proceedings,
including the actual payment or tender of compensation, to acquire a title
to the land, or to an easement in it.
23. That an action or trespass qua. cla. may be maintained to recover
damages for the continuance of such occupation, unless compensation, or a
tender of it, be made within a reasonable time after the commencement of
it.
24. That under such circumstances an action of trespass, or an action on
the case may be maintained to recover damages for all the injuries occasioned by the prior occupation.-Cushman vs. Smith,
266
CONTRACT.
A contract for the sale of personal chattels over the value of $30, made
in New Jersey, but to be performed in Pennsylvania, must, in order to be
binding, be made according to the formalities prescribed by the statute of
New Jersey, for the prevention of frauds and perjuries.-Dacosta vs.
Davis,

.
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COPY-RIGHT.
1. Whether an author who gives his work to the public by printing and
publishing it in a newspaper, not protected by any copy-right, can have
such a right in the same work by afterwards publishing it in a different
form, as in a volume or book.-Qu.
2. Whether the deposite of a title page in the clerk's office, when the
work it was intended for was not then printed nor written, nor the manuscript prepared for printing and publication, although the notes or materials from which the work or book was to be, and afterwards was composed, were then in the hands of the author, will entitle him to the copyright of the work so afterwards prepared and composed.-Qu.
3. If the right exists under the circumstances stated in the first and
second queries, then, whether one can be charged with an infringement of
this right if he has, in fact, never seen or copied from the book so entered
and secured, or in any manner used it in his publication, but has reprinted
the whole from a public newspaper, unprotected by copy-right, in which
he found it, and where the author himself had published it.-Qu.
4. Whether the fact of it being stated in some of the newspapers publishing as aforesaid, that the author had secured a copy-right, can in any
way help him.-Qu.
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5. Where there is a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a copy-right,
an injunction will not be granted to stay its infringement.-Miller vs.
AlcElroy,
-.
..
.198
6. The translation into a foreign language of a French work, in France,
is a breach of the copy-right.
7. The manager of a theatre cannot cause to be performed in France, an
opera translated into a foreign language, without paying both the author
of the music and the words for the use of copy-right, under the law of the
18th-19th January, 1791, and the decree of the 8th of June, 1806.-Lum.
499
ley contre Bayard,
-.
CORPORATION.
1. The distinction between public and private corporations has reference
to their powera and the purposes of their creation. They are public when
created for public purposes only, connected with the administration of the
government, and when the interests and franchises are the exclusive property and.domain of the government. All other corporations are private.
2. Over public corporations the Legislature has power not limited by the
constitution, to impose such modifications and restraints as the general interests may require, without infringing private rights.
3. Grants and charters of private corporations, when accepted, assume
the character and elements of contracts, from which rights and franchises
may flow, but over which, without the consent of the corporation, the Legislature has no more control than over private ights of. property, unless on
default of the corporation judicially established.
4. When incorporated, the trustees of funds for the use of schools in a
town constitute a private corporation; and that portion of an Act of the
Legislature providing for the division of the same town, and an incorporation of a part of the territory into a aeparate town, which requires the
trustees to divide the fund, (and pay over a portion of it to other trustees,
who were to receive and appropriate it to the use of schools in the town
then incorporated,) ii in violation of private rights, and in conflict with
the provision of the Constitution, which prohibits the Legislature from any
law impairing the obligation of contracts, and is inoperative and void.The Inhabitants of Yarmouth vs. The Trustees of the School Fund in North
Yarmouth, et als.
.
.
.
.
. 596
5. A society which has claimed and exercised the rights and powers of
a corporation for twenty years, is a corporation de facto, and as such, capable of takinga beques4 though the proof of its incorporation be technically
defective.
6. A devise to an unincorporated association is void at law, and an incorporation after the testator's death will not validate it.-Chittenden vs.
538
.
.
..
.
....
Chittenden,
7. It is a settled principle in equity, that a majority of a joint stock
association cannot use the joint property except within the scope of their
business, without being liable to be restrained by injunction.'
8. A corporator would be bound by a modification of a charter by legislative action, which is only an auriliary,but not afundamental change.
9. Where a corporation procures from the Legislature, by a supplemental act, authority to make a fundamental change in their charter, as to
extend their railway to a different point, and thus really construct a new
road, the rights of an individual corporator, as such, who does not assent
thereto, are not thereby affected, although there be a majority vote of the
corporation accepting the act.-Stevens vs. The Rutland and Burlington
Railroad Co.
.
.
.
. 154
10. Where, by the terms of its charter, a corporation is prohibited from
loaning anypart of the funds deposited to a directer, such loan, if made,
cannot be recovered, and any security taken for it is void. Nor can the
provision of the charter be evaded by borrowing in the name of a stranger,
where the director is really, and is known to be the person borrowing the
money.- But this doctrine does not extend to any other corporation bor-
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rowing, whereof a director chances to be a stockholder.-Albert vs. The
City of Baltimore,
CRIMINAL LAW.
A policeman ought not, in: general, to question prisoners who are in his
custody; but if he does, the interrogation ought not to be confined to questions calculated to compromise the party.-Per ALDERSON, B.-Reg. vs.
Stokes,
CUSTOM.
A custom, when fully established, becomes the law of the trade in reference to which it exists; and it will be presumed that the parties intended
to conform to it, when they have been silent on the subject.-Chase vs.
Washburn,
CY-PRES.
See Trust.
DAMAGE.
See Bill of Lading.
DAMAGES.
See Land for Public Use: Railway Passenger: Telegraph Companies.
DEED.
Where an estate to A. and his heirs, &c., is given in the premises of a
deed, but the word " heirs" is omitted in the habendam, the latter may be
disregarded, and A. will take an estate in fee.-Breitenback vs. Dungan,
Executor,
DELAWARE RIVER.
1. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, under the acts of
1803 and 1818, have jurisdiction to authorize the construction of wharves,
&c,, in the river Delaware, as far north as the mouth of Frankford Creek.
2, But the Board has no jurisdiction out of the tide-way of the river, and
cannot authorize such construction in the creek itself,
3. The Board of Wardens cannot confer any right on the owners of land
bordering on the river to encroach upon its channel, so as to create a puryresture, or public nuisance,
4. The owners of land in Pennsylvania, bordering on a navigable river,
have not the right of soil to the centre of the stream. They have, however,
thq right to erect wharves or buildings to ordinary low water mark; and
this right, in the port of Philadelphia, is not, it seems, dependent on the
license of the Board of Wardens,
5. A gradual alteration of the channel of a navigable stream will control
the rights of the owners of adjacent land to erect wharves therein.-Frankford vs. Lennig,
6. By the law of Pennsylvania, the river Delaware is a public navigable
river, held by its joint sovereigns in trust for the public.
7. Riparian owners in that State have no title to the river, or any right
to divert its waters, unless by license from the States.
8. That such licence is revocable, and in subjection to the superior right
of the State to divert the water for public improvements, either by the
State directly, or by a corporation created for that purpose.
9. The proviso to the provincial acts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey,
of 1791, does not operate as a grant of the usufruct of the waters of the
river to Adam Hoops and his assigns, but only as a license or toleration of
his dam.
10. As by the laws of his own State the plaintiff who claimed under
Hoops could have no remedy against a corporation authorized to take the
whole waters of the river for the purpose of canals or improving the navigation, so neither can he sustain a suit against a corporation created by
New Jersey for the same purpose, who have taken part of the waters.
11. The plaintiffs being but tenants at sufferance in the usufruct of the
water to the two States who use the river as tenants in common, are not in
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a condition to question the relative rights of either to use its waters without consent of the other.
12. This case is not intended to decide whether a first licensee for private emolument can support an action against a later licensee of either
sovereign or both, who, for private purposes, diverts the water to the injury
of the first.-Rundle, Trustee, vs. The Delaware and Raritan Canal Co.
326

'

DEPOSIT.
See Mutuum.
DICTA,Of Chancellor Kent, 3 Comm. 106; and of Judge Story, Comment. on
Bills, 261, overraled.-Lawson vs. The Bank of Salem,
627, 628, 629
DOMICILE.
See Slave.
DONATIO CAUSA MORTIS.
1. A gift of all the donor's property in prospect of death is a will, and
not a donatio mortis causa. It is not valid unless executed either as a written or as a nuncupative will.
2. In support of an alleged donatio mortis causa, the evidence was, that
the decedent said, in extremis, to the donee, "Ann, I am dying; all I have
is with you, and all is yours; do what you-can for me; there are my
keys." The decedent had then in her room two trunks, one containing
clothing, and the other n non-negotiable note, and a deposit hook with a
savng fund society, and other articles. The beneficiary thereupon tobk
the keys, which were hanging at the bed-side, in the presence of the
donor. Hdd that the Court below erred in permitting the evidence to go
to the jury.
..
3. Cases of donations mortis causa are exceptions, not to be extended by
way of analogy.-Headley vs. Kirby,
25
EDITOR.
1. The editor of an encyclopedia has no right to alter the manuscript of a
contributor whose article appears in his own name, in order to harmonize
it with the general doctrines of the work.-Malgaigne vs. De St. Priest,
42
2. The editor of a periodical who has accepted and begun the publication
of a literary work, cannot suspend that publication without the consent of
the author.-Saint Julien vs. Douniol,
.
.
.
. 46
EVIDENCE.
See Libel.
1. In the trial of a question of insanity, evidence of hereditary taint is
competent to corroborate direct-proof.-Smith vs. Kramer,
- 353
2. Evidence is admissible to show that the principal witness for one of
the parties in a cause had been guilty of an attempt at subornation of perjury therein, in order to affect'his credibility.-Morgan vs. Frees,
92
FACTOR.
See Replevin.
FIXTURE.
1. A fixture is an article which was a chattel, but which, by being
annexed or affixed to the realty, became accessory to it, and parcel of it.
2. The true criterion of a fixture is the united application of the following requisites, to wit: 1. Actual annexation to the realty, or something
appurtenant thereto. 2. Application to the use or purpose to which that
part of the realty with which it is connected, is appropriated. 3. The
intention of the party making the annexation, to make a permanent accession to the freehold.
3. The criterion of a fixture applicable to machinery in a mill or manufactory, is not different from that which applies to articles affixed to the
freehold in any other situation.
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4. A mill or manufactory, including all its essential parts, may unite in
the same business, and for producing a common result, portions of real
estate, with articles of personal property retaining all the essential qualities of chattels.
5. The machinery in a woolen factory, consisting of carding machines,
spinning machines, power looms, &c., connected with the motive power of
the steam engine by bands and straps, but in no wise attached to the
building in which used, except by cleats, or other means to confine them
to their proper places for use, and subject to removal whenever convenience or business may require without injury, are not fixtures, but chattel
property.
6. The legal qualities of articles attached to the realty, may be fixed or
ascertained from the agreement and understanding of parties; and a sale
and conveyance of a mill or manufacturing establishment as such, by any
general name, or terms of description commonly understood to embrace
all its essential parts, passes the machinery belonging to such mill or
establishment, whether affixed to the freehold or not; but otherwise, if
the ]anguage is merely descriptive of the realty with its appurtenances.
. 723
..
.
Teaff vs. Hewitt, et al.,
FORENSIC MEDICINE.
11

--

Observations on the Tests for Arsenic.,

FRAUD.
See Bill in Chancery.
FUGITIVE SLAVE.
See Constitutional Law.
1. Though the penalty given by the 4th section of the Act of 1793, with
regard to Fugitives from Labor, is repealed by the Act of 1850, the reservation of the right of action by the owners of such fugitives, for the injuries
enumerated therein, is not affected.
2. "Notice" under the Act means knowledge; it is not necessary that a
specific written, or verbal notice, from the owner of fugitive slaves, should
be brought home to the defendant, in an action for "harboring and concealing," in order to make him liable.
3. "Harboring," within the Act, is not synonymous with "concealment," but consists in any entertainment or shelter for an unlawful purpose. Mere acts of charity, however, will not constitute the offence.
4. In order to enable a plaintiff to recover in an action for "harboring
and concealing" fugitive slaves, he must prove that the slaves were pursued
by himself or his agent, for the purpose of reclamation; and that the defendant, knowing them to be fugitives, harbored or concealed them in
order to further their cscape, and to enable them to elude pursuit.
5. Where, in such action, it is shown that in consequence of the harboring and concealment, the slaves escaped, and were lost to their owner, the
measure of damages is the value of the slaves, with interest, if the jury
think fit; otherwise, however, if the interence of the defendant was
only after the plaintiff had abandoned all pursuit of his slaves.
6. In such action, the plaintiff is entitled to recover entire damages
against all engaged in furthering the escape, and in frustrating his pursuit.
7. Possession of slaves, otherwise shown to be such, is Pima facie proof
of title, and no fornial bill of sale is necessary to etablish ownership.
8. In an action for "harboring and concealing," under the Act of
1793, it appeared that the owner of the slaves, in carrying them from
Arkansas to Maryland, from which State they afterwards escaped, had
passed with them on the National Road over the State of Pennisylvania;
but that, on their arrival in Maryland, they had been duly registered,
according to law, as slaves, held, that such transit had not rendered them
free, but that their status was to be determined by the law of Maryland.
Oliver vs. Kauffman,

.

.

.

.

.
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INDICTMENT.
1. Since the Act of April 11, 1848, in Pennsylvania, the property of a married woman is absolutely vested in herself, and hence, in a prosecution for
larceny of wife's property, such property must be laid in the indictment to
be in the wife, or the prosecution cannot be sustained. Comwonwealth vs.
- 434
Martin,
2. The utterance of obscene, words in public, being.a gross violation of
public decency tiid good morals, is indictable.
8. In proiecution for the utterance of obscene language in public, it is
not necessary that the words should be proven eiactly as charged to have
67
been spoken. Bell vs. The State,
INFRINGEMENT.
See Patent.
A sale of the thing patented, to an agent of the patentee, employed by
him to make the purchase, on account of the patentee, is not per se an
infringement. Accompanied by other circumstances, it may be evidence
- 139
of an infringement. Ezekiel Byam vs. John Bullard,
INJUNCTION.
See Copyright.
A Court of Equity will not interfere'by injunction in the case of a public nuisance, where there exists any doubt of the character or legality of
the act complained of, but will leave the partidsito an indictment, or direct
- 57
an issue. Frankford us. Lennig,
INSURANCE.
1. H. effected an insurance upon a certain building, partly frame and
partly brick; subsequent to the insurance, and without notice to the Insurance Company,- H. erected a frame building contiguous to the one
insured, which latter building took fire, and caused the former to burn.
edd, ihat H. could not recover, because the erection of the frame building
was a breach of good faith, and the loss was caused by his own misconduct.
2. Held, That had the building insured been burned without the occasion of its destruction, being the frame, he might recover, because no
actual injury had thence arisen. Howard vs. The Kentucky and Louis.
.
.
. 686
ville Mutual Insurance Company,
3. Construction of clauses in fire policy respecting subsequent insurance, and termination of interest.
4. A conveyance which equity will treat as a mortgage, does not termiI
nate the interest of the assured.
5. Insurance made by a mortgagee, at the expense of the mortgagor, is
subsequent insurance by the mortgagor. Holbrooke vs. TheAm. Ins. Co., 18
JUDGE'S CHARGEA judge's charge to a jury mdst be accurate, not only in its outline, but
also in its dstail, or this Court will reverte on error. New York Railroad
97
vs. Skinner,
JUDGMENT CONFESSED.
A judgment confessed or conveyance mdde for hn antecedent debt, by a
debtor in insolvent circumstances, and in contemplation of an assignment,
with intent to evade the'Act of 1843, in. regard to preferences in assignments, is not avoided by the proviso in the Act of 1849, where the creditor
bad no knowledge of, nor participated in the unlawful intent. Hutchinson
.
.
..
170
vs. McClure, et al,
.
JUDGMENT CREDITOR.
,1. A creditor by judgment, though for contemporaneous advances, is
not a purchaser within the Recording Acts, nor is he protected against a
trust of which he has had no notice.
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2. Trustees for the payment of debts under a codicil to a will, conveyed
laud to D. the testator's widow and' executrix, who had been given a life
estate therein by the will. The conveyance was nominally for value, but
in fact no consideration passed, and it was merely made for the-purpose of
vesting the legal estate in D. to enable her to raise money to pay the testator's debts. The widow gave a mortgage on the pkoperty, under which it
was sold. Hdd, that the land was bound by the trust in the hands of D.,
.and that her judgment creditors, standing in no better position than herself, were not entitled to be paid out of the proceeds remaining after the
payment of the mortgage, as against the creditors of the testator. Joel
Cadbury vs. Catharine Duval,
.
.
.
.
105
LAND FOR PUBLIC USE.
1. Where land is taken for a public use, or by a railroad company, in
the absence of any special provision, only the quantity of the land appropriated, the place where it lies, with reference to external circumstance,
and the form in which it is taken, can enter into the estimate of the
damages.
2. But any general effect that the actual or contemplated construction
of the road, or special effect of its location at the particular place, may
have upon the value of the land, whether to improve or lessen the price, is
not to be considered in the valuation.
3. So the incidental injuries or advantages, benefits or injuries caused
thereby, are to be left out of view.-Woodfolk vs. The Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad Company,
- 550
6
LEVY.
See Partnership.
LIBEL.
1. The incongruous rule of the Courts of New York and other States,
that a defendant in an action for slander or libel, might show, to rebut the
presumption of malice, that he belieVed the charge when made to be true,
but must not show anything tending'to prove it true, traced to its origin in
the case of Underwood vs. Parks, 2 Strange, 1200.
2. The rule in Underwood vs. Parks, is shown not to be an original rule
of the common law, but a departure therefrom, and a mere piece of judicial
legislation. The defect in this legislation in excluding appropriate matter
in mitigation, because not pleaded, without providing any mode in which it
could be pleaded, exhibited. Also shown, how the matter was made still
worse by the gratuitous adotftion of another rule, viz.: that pleading the
truth of the charge in justification, was conclusive evidence of malice in the
original publication.
8. Section 165 of the New York Code of Procedure, properly construed,
affords a complete remedy for the evils resulting from these unjust rules,
4. The construction given to this section, in Graham vs. Stone, 6 How.
Pr. R. 15, disapproved, and shown to leave the matter in a worse condition
than before
5 The subject of giving evidence in actions of slander of previous reports
of the truth of the character in mitigation, considered; and the distinction
between such evidence as bearing upon the character of the plaintiff, and
upon the presumption of malice on the part of the defendant, adverted to.
Evidence of this kind being admitted in England for the latter purpose,
but not in the State of New York.
6. The difference in actions for libel, between cases where the libellous
article is merely a republication of an article previously published, and
where it re-asserts the charge, referring to the previous article as authority,
exhibited.
7. In the former case, the prior publication may be given in evidence in
mitigation; in the latter-Quere.
8. The rule in relation to striking out redundant matter under the code
is, that unless it is clear that no evidence can properly be received under
the allegations objected to, they will be retained until the trial.
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9. When therefore the alleged libel contained the following: "The indictment brought against him, (the plaintiff) by his own friends, has never
been answered or disproved. He stands accused of a heedless and extravagant, if not corrupt squandering of the canal funds under his control ;
and this we presume the Courier regards as one proof of the 'friendliness'
of Mr. Follet for the canal;" and the answer set up in mitigation, that the
.State Auditor had made a report to the Canal Board, charging the plaintiff substantially, as charged in the libellous article, which report had been
published in the newspapers of the State with comments: and that the
article complained of was based upon such reports and comments, and was
a legitimate commentary thereon; a motion to strike out the matter so
pleaded in mitigation, as redundant, was refused.-Follett vs. Jewett, 600
LIEN BY SEAMEN.
Sbe Admiralty.
LIEN.
See Attorney. Part Owner.
LIGHTS AT SEA.
Though a sailing vessel is not bound to carry lights at sea, yet if a collision occurs, occasioned by their absence, the party thus in fault, will be
held liable.-Pahner vs. The Osprey, 15
MANUFACTURED ARTICLE.
See Title to Manufactured Article.
MARRIED WOMAN.
See Indictment.
MUTUUM.
1. In case of a regular deposit of whtat with a warehouseman, a liability for the value of the wheat is incurred by the depositary, in case he
mixes it with other wheat in his warehouse, and ships the same on his
own account, notwithstanding he may supply the place of the depositor's
wheat by other wheat procured and deposited in his warehouse: and the
destruction, by accident, of the warehouse, and the wheat supplied to take
the place of the depositor's wheat, will not protect the depositary from this
liability to the depositor.
2. In case of an irregular deposit, or mutuum, where the obligation imposed on the depositary, or mutuary, is to re-deliver, not the specific thing
furnished, but another article of the same kind and value; or, where the
depositary has the option to return the specific article received, or another
of the same kind and value, in either'case the property passes to the depositary, as fully as in a case of ordinary sale or exchange, and the risk of
loss by accident follows the cbntrol or dominion over the property.--Chase
et al. 'vs. Washburn, -.
.
.
487
NEGLIGENCE.
See Railway. Carrier of Passenger. Railway Passenger. Servant.
In an Action on the Case the Declaration alleged that the Defendants
were Proprietors of certain Railways, and possessed of certain Carriages
for the Conveyance of Horses, &c. for Hire: that, according to the
known Course of Business by the Defendants, it was the Duty of the Defendants to cause due care to be taken in order to 'guard against Friction
arising during the Journey from the Wheels and Axles of the said Carriages, &c.; and that, in order to preserve such Carriages, &c. from being
injured by such Friction, the Persons employing the Defendants had no
Power over the Management of the said Carriages, nor were they permitted to do any such Things as were necessary to guard against such
Friction: that the Plaintiffs delivered to, and the Defendants received
divers Horses from the Plaintiffs to be carried by the Defendants in their
Carriages for Reward, according to the known Course of Business so practised as aforesaid, except so far as the same was altered by certain Terms

769

INDEX.
expressed in a certain Ticket then by the defendants prepared and produced to the plaintiffs, and which Ticket expressed that it was issued
"subject to the plaintiffs undertaking to bear all the risks of injury by
conveyance and other contingencies ;" and that the plaintiffs were to see
to the efficiency of the carriages, and that the defendants were not to be
responsible "for any damages, however caused, to horses," &c., travelling upon the said railways: that the defendants did not take due and
proper care to provide against friction of the wheels and axles, but altogether grossly and culpably neglected so to do; by reason whereof, and
of the gross and culpable negligence of the defendants, the wheels of the
carriages in which the horses were, took fire, and that after such fire
had been produced, and the carriage had become dangerous, &c., and after
the defendants had notice thereof, &c., they recklessly, culpably, and with
gross negligence, and against the will of the plaintiffs, continued to carry
the said horses, &c., in the said carriage, until the axle became further
heated, and broke, whereby the carriage was thrown off the rails, and the
horses were injured :-It was Held, that the negligence imputed, whether
called "gross negligence" or "culpable negligence," was within the exemption from responsibility provided by the contract, and that the declaration therefore disclosed no cause of action, and was bad in arrest of
judgment.

Austin vs. The Manchester Railway,

-

- 114

-

NEGLIGENCE BY SERVANT.
See Railway Passenger. Railway Servant.
NEW YORK CODE.
See Libel.
NOTICE.
See Bill of Exchange.
OBSCENE WORDS.
See Indictment.
PARTNERSHIP.
See Co-owners.
1. A Sheriff acting under an execution at the suit of a judgment creditor of one partner in a firm, can sell and deliver. nct p zt of the partnership goods, but only the contingent interest of tl4* debtor partner in the
stock and profits, after settlement of partnership accounts, and payment of
partnership creditors.
2. The only levy that can be made on such an execution, consistently
with the principles of the partnership relation, is of the debtor's interest in
the whole stock, and that is to be measured by final account.'
3. Where one partner sued the Sheriff, his deputy, and the execution
creditor, in trespass for seizing and selling the partnership goods on an
execution against his co-partner, and the defendants pleaded not guilty;
held, that the nonjoinder of all the owners as plaintiffs could only be taken
advantage of by plea in abatement, and that such plea was too late after
the general issue pleaded.
4. The Sheriff and his deputy were liable as trespassers in such case, in
virtue of their office. The plaintiff in the execution would not be a trespasser, unless he did something more than merely issue his writ; but if
he attended the sale and bought part of the property, he is liable as a trespasser.

Deal et aL v8. Bogue,

-

.

.

.

. 801

5. The purchaser of the interest of one of several partners has no right
to interfere personally in the affairs of the partnership, and a refusal of
the remaining partners to permit him to do so will not entitle him to the
interference of a Court of Equity by injunction, or the appointment of a
receiver.
6. A provision in partnership articles that neither of the partners should
sell or assign his interest without consulting the other partes, and giving
them the preference, does not by implication authorize the introduction of

49
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a stranger into the firm by one of the partners, on a refusal by the rest to
purchase his share. McGlensey vs. Coz,
34
PATENT.
See Infringement.
1. Where M., in 1853, purchased a right to construct and use certain
patent machines, and under this right did construct and put in operation
the machines, the right to their use d6es not terminate with the expiration
of the original patent, but still continues under an extension or enlargement of the grant by Act of Congress.
2. There is a distinction between the grant of a right to make and Tend
a manhine, and a grant of the right to use it.
3. A special Act of Congress in favor of a patentee, extending the time
beyond that originally limited, is engrafted on the general law, unless the
language of the Act should require a different construction.
4. Qn? Whether Congress could pass a law.which should deprive the
citizen of the use of his property after he had purchased the absolute right
to use from the inventor.

Bloomer vs. McQuewan,

- 471

PERSONATION OF JUROR.
Where a person not returned on the venirs answers for a juror who was
returned and goes into the jury box hnd hears a capital case, and renders
a-verdict, assuming to be the juror actually pummoned, a new trial will be
granted.

Commonwealth vs. Spring,

- 424

-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
See Replevin. Attorney.
PROMISSORY NOTE.
See Consideration.
1. The payee of a promissory note, who transfers it for a valuable consideration, though after its maturity, impliedly warrants that it is not void
for usury.
2. The ground of implied warranty, either of title or quality, at common
law, is the presumed superior knowledge of the vendor: per SFLrDzN, J.
-. A., the payee of a4.overdue note, transferred it for a valuable consideration,. to D., who sued on it; but the defence of usury being interposed by the maker, the latter had judgment, with costs. D. then brought
an action against the administrator of A., for the amount paid on the sale
of the note; hd, that he w" entitled to recover.
4. Hel, also, that he might have not only the defendant's, but his.own
costs in the prior action; quare, whether he was not entitled also to counsel fees therein.

Buell v8. BissellAd"niistrator,

-

-

-
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RAILWAY COMPANY.
1. An. action on the case for negligently conducting a railway train,
may be maintained; as to what constitutes negligence, gumrm.
2. A Railway Company is a purchaser for valuable consideration of the
exclusiveuse of the land, over which the track is- laid, as -ahil corporeal
hereditament, and may use thereon the greatest allowable rate of speed,
without interference from strangers.
3. By the common law of Pennsylvania, as well as by the common law
of England, the owner of cattle is bound -to keep them within his own
custody at his peril, though he may let them go at large without incurring
liability from entry on unenclosed woodland or waste field, and this because of the peculiar circumstances of the people here.
A Railway Company is responsible only for negligence or wanton injury,
and the owner of cattle killed or injured on their track, can have no recourse to the Company or its servants ;-and such owner is liable for
damages done by his cattle to the company or its passengers. The new
York and Erie Railway vs. Skinner,
97
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RAILWAY PASSENGER.
1. A passenger carried gratuitously, or as a matter of courtesy, in the
cars of a Railroad Company, who is injured by an accident arising from
the gross negligence of the servants of the Corporation, is entitled to recover against the latter.
2. Quere whether the Corporation would not be also liable in a case of
simple negligence ?
3. That a pasenger injured by an accident occasioned by the negligence of the servants of a Railroad Company, is also a stockholder therein,
will not affect his right to damages.
4. A master is liable for the negligence of his servant in the course of
his employment, though the particular act be contrary to, express orders.
5. D., a stockholder in a Railroad Corporation, was on the road of the
latter by invitation of the President, not in the usual passenger cars, but
in a small locomotive car used for the convenience of officers of the Company, and paying no fare for his transportation. A collision occurred with
another engine belonging to the same Company, which was by gross negligence, and contrary to express orders given to the driver, on the same
track, moving in the opposite direction; and in this accident, D. received
serious injury. Held, that he was entitled to recover in case, against the
Company. Reading Railroad vs. Derby,
397
RAILWAY SERVANT.
1. One employee or servant has no right of action against the principal
or master for an injury sustained through the negligence of another employee or servant in the same service.
2. When a Rail Road Company places in the hands of one that it employs,
when lie is employed, printed rules and regulations to which he is required
to conform if he enters into their service or employment, one of which is,
that "the regular compensation will cover all risk or liability from any cause
whatever, in the service of the Company," that becomes an express provision
of the contract, by which he waives all claim for any injury received in
such service. Robert Mitchell vs. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 717
RE-ARGUMENT.
The Supreme Court will not order the re-arpument of a case once decided, on motion of Counsel, but only where some one of the majority of
the Court expresses a doubt and desires a re-argument. It makes no
difference that the decision of affirmance was by a divided Court. Aspden
vs. Aspden,
.
.
.
.
.
.
335
REPLEVIN.
1. A factor who accepts a bill, drawn against a particular consignment
of merchandise, which has been so far executed as to be placed in the
hands of a third person to be delivered to him, acquires thereby a property in the goods, which will enable him to maintain replevin against an
attaching creditor of the consignor, to whom the officer making the attachment had delivered the goods. Nesmith et al. vs. The Dyeing, Bleaching and Callendering Company, 82
2. No 'bill of lading, or other formal document, is necessary to create
the title in such case, nor is it necessary that the depositary should be
employed by the consignee, nor that he should know the particulars of the
consignee's title. Ibid.
RIPARIAN OWNER.
See Delaware River.
SALE.
See Mutuum.
1. Where a warehouseman receives wheat, and by the consent of the
owner, or in accordance with the custom of trade, mixes the wheat in
a common mass with other wheat in his warehouse, with the under.tanding that he is to retain or ship the same for sale, on his own
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account, at pleasure; and, on presentation of the warehouse receipt, is
either to pay the market price thereof in money, or re-deliver the wheat,
or other wheat in place of it, the transaction is not a bailment, but a sale,
and the property passes to the depositary, and carries with it the risk of
loss by accident.-Chase vs. Washburn,
487
2. The concealment of a known defect in a horse, not within the reach
of observation by the vendee, and not made known to him at the sale, such
as glanders, which, by reason of powders administered by the vendor, had
assumed a lateint form, will avoid the contract.-Cassel vs. Herron,
- 681
SALVAGE.
1. The ship Willlam Penn went ashore off Charleston harbor. The
steamer Jasper, after remaining by the ship during a night of considerable
peril, succeeded in dragging her over the shoal, and did not leave her until
she was anchored in deep water. Fifteen per cent. upon the value of the
ship, together with costs, allowed to the salvors.
2. Salvage services by steam vessels encouraged-additional remuneration decreed. The doctrine of the Raikes, 1 Hagg., p. 246, affirmed.
3. The principles upon which the Admiralty proceeds in awarding salvage, laid down. The William Beckford], 3 C. Rob. 355, adopted.
4. In apportioning salvage among the officers and crew of a steamer, the
Court regards their responsibilities in their different stations. Equal
shares given to the master and pilot.-Brooks vs. The Win. ,Penn, 584
SCHOOL FUND.
See Corporation.
SEAMAN.
See Will.
SERVANT.
"
See Negligence: Railway Servant.
SET-OFF.
1. A debt due to the defendant as executor, for money had and received
after the feath of the testator, may be set-off against a debt due from the
defendant as executor, 'which become due from the testator before his
death.
2. Judgment may be moved for non obstante veredicto on a plea of setoff.-Mardall vs. Thelluson,
- 561
SHERIFF.
See Partnership.
SLANDER.
See Libel.
..
SLAVE.
1. A slave carried into Pennsylvania, with her owner's consent, and
residing in that State for a period of more than six months, with a full
knowledge on the part of the owner, of the Pennsylvania Act of 1780, is
entitled to her freedom,
2. Such law operates permanently upon'the rights of stingers where
they are informed of its provisions, and may, if they choose, avoid its consequence.-Ferry vs. Street,
295
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
See Contract.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The statute of limitations does not apply to bank bills in favor of the
bank.-Dougherty vs. The Bank,
689
STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.
1. Where J. W. purchased certain merchandise at Wilmington, N. C.,
and shipped it on board a vessel bound to New Orleans, consigned to A.
& R., to be forwarded to J. W. at Cincinnati, with instructions to Mi. & R.
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to sell it at a certain price: and thereupon a portion is sold and a portion
remains unsold and continues its transit, the latter is still subject to the
vendor's right of stoppage in transitu, the middle man having no such possession as to end the transit.
2. An effort to sell, or a sale of part of goods consigned to a forwarding
merchant, in obedience to instructions, is not such a change of the destination or possession of the whole as to destroy the vendor's right in
transitu.
3. Goods in transit stopped by a general creditor, are still subjected to
- 290
the vendor's claim for the purchase money. Secomb vs. Wade,
SUICIDE.
A party cannot be convicted of an attempt to commit suicide, if, at the
time of the act done, he was so drunk as not to know what he was about.
37
.
..
Reg. vs. 'Moore,
SURRENDER OF FUGITIVE.
See Constitutional Law.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.
Telegraph Companies holding themselves out -to transmit despatches
correctly, are bound so to do, or respond in damages, unless the causes of
failure are beyond their control. Bowen vs. The Lake Erie Telegraph
.
. 685
.
.
.
.
Company,
TITLE TO MANUFACTURED ARTICLE.
1. The manufacture of an article, pursuant to the order of a customer,
does not transfer the title.
2. Neither does the tender of the article, when so manufactured, transfer
the title.
3. Neither does the leaving with the customer, against his will, of the
article so manufactured and tendered, transfer the title.
4. To pass the title, there must be an acceptance, either express or implied.
5. An action against the customer, as for an article sold and delivered,
cannot be maintained by the manufacturer, unless the article have been
accepted.
6. An exception to this rule obtains, when the customer employs a
superintendent, and bays for the property by instalments as the work progresses. Moody vs. Brown,
- 431
TRESPASS ON THE CASE.
See Constitutional Law.
TRESPASS QUARE CLAU FREGIT.
See lb.
TRESPASS.
See Partnership.
TROVER.
1. When the plaintiff, as insurer, by several counts claims damages for
expenses alleged to have been incurred in the investigation of representations falsely and fraudulently made to him by the defendant, for the purpose of procuring a policy upon the life of his debtor, and no evidence is
given to support these counts, but evidence that certain representations
made by defendant at the time was produced, a count in trover joined with
them is not sustained.
2. Whether, if such a policy were fraudulently procured, troverwould lie
for it.3. It seems, if there be any common law remedy, detinue is the proper
one; but redress might be sought in a Court of Chancery upon an applica-
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tion for a surrender of the policy for cancellation.-North American Insurance Company vs. Levy,
TRUST.
See Judgment Creditor. Will.
1. T. J.-directed his executors by his will, to purchase $6,800 of six per
cent. stock of t-he City of Baltimor6, which he ordered to be set apart
and held by S. J., Jr., and A. D. J., as trustees, in trust for his
daughter, E. J. A. This stock was accordingly purchased by S. J., Jr.,
- and A. D. J., as executors, and transferred to themselves as trustees, by the
proper officer of the City, on the 10th December, 1841, and, at the same
time, they directed the interest to be paid to E. J. A., or her order, until
the power should be withdrawn. On the 16th of October, 1845, the trustees transferred this stock to the Savings Bank of Baltimore, and thereupon the'Bank loaned money to S. J., Jr., in his individualname, who subsequently became insolvent, the other trustee having died; held, that from
this state of facts there did not arise such knowledge on the part of the
City of Baltimore of the designs of S. J., Jr., or such neglect on the part
of its officers, as to render the City liable for the trustees' misapplication
of their cestui que truet. property.
2. It is no answer, on the part of the Savings Bank, that the loan of the
money and the hypothecation of the stock .by.A. D. J., is an.executed con-tract. A, D. J. might be estopped from denying its legality, but it is
othervse with his cestut gue truwt.-Albert and Wife vs. The City of Baltimore and the Savings Bank of Baltimore,
3. A bequest to trustees f a certain sum of money to be expended by
them "for the support of indigent pious young men preparing for the
.ministry in New Haven,".is void for uncertainty.
4. The doctrine of cy-pres is not recognized in Connecticut.-In re,
,White,trusteei
USUFRUCT OF WATER.
- See Delaware River.
VENUE.
1. The Court will order the venue changed, even when laid in the proper
county, if it appears that a fair trial cannot be had there.
2. In order to warrant a change of venue, it must appear that a fair trial
cannot be had in the county where it is laid by positive evidence or facts,
and not by the mere opinion of the witnesses. Murray vs. The New Jersey
Railroad and Transportation Company,
WAREHOUSE RECEIPT.
See SaleWEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.
The Court is reluctant, at all times, to set aside the verdict of a jury
because they have erred in weighing evidence; nor will the Court feel at
liberty to do this, where the jury have passed upon a mere question of
fact, unless the verdict is so palpably against the evidence as 'to 6how that
their minds were not open to reason and conviction, or that an improper
influence was brought to bear on their deliberations. Derwort.vm. Loomer,
WILL.
See Trust.
-1. -Where R., rho died in .837, had executed a will in 1819, 'wherein he
devised one-half hiszeal'estate "to his legal and natural heirs and their
heirs forever, to be divided-among them in equal shares, to be share and
share alike." Held, that only those who would have been heirs under the
act of 1838, came within the description, and therefore, that children of
decased nephews and nieces did not take.
2. Under a devise to "heirs," the estate vests in those who answer that
description at the time of the death of the testator. Where a term of
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known legal signification is used, the Courts will consider that the testator
used that term in that recognized sense, and will so construe the will.-In
re Nathan Ramsey's Estate,
.
.
.
.
94
3. A testator, by his will, proved in 1829, devised as follows: "Piriwipally and first of all, I commend my soul into the hands of Almighty God
who gave it, and my body to the earth, to be buried in a decent and Christian like manner, at the discretion of my executors hereinafter named, and
as to suchworldly estate wherewith it has pleased God to bless me in this
life, I give and dispose of the same in the following manner, to wit: Itfe,
it is my will, and I order and direct that all my just debts and funeral
expenses shall be first paid and satisfied. Item, it is my will, and I give,
devise and bequeath unto my beloved wife, Elizabeth, eighty-five acres,
and allowance of land of my dwelling plantation, whereon I now live, situate in Spring Garden township, in the county aforesaid, she to have the
choice of the same wherever she thinks proper; and further, I do give and
bequeath unto my said wife, all my movable property or personal estate,
of what kind or nature the same may be, together with all the monies due
me, by bond, note or book account, to and for her only proper use and
behoof whatever. Item, it is further my will, that my brother and sisters
divide the residue of my said plantation amongst themselves, share and
share alike. Held, that the introductory words might be brought down to
interpret the subsequent devise to the wife, and that they enlarged it into
a fee.-BLAcK, C. J. GIBsoN, J., dissenting.-Schrivervs. Myer,
- 227
4. Where one devises all his real estate for life, and all his personal
estate absolutely, "having full confidence that his wife will leave the surplus to be divided at her decease justly among her children," the words do
not of themselves import a trust, nor will they be so construed without
other expressions to control them.
5. Words in a will expressive of desire, recommendation, and confidence,
are not words of technical, but of common parlance, and are notprimafade
sufficient to convert a devise or bequest into a trust; and the old Roman
and English rule on this subject is not part of the common law of Pennsylvaum
6. Such words may amount to a declaration of trust, when it appears
from other parts of the will, that the testator intended not to commit the
estate to the devisee or legatee, or the ultimate disposal of it to his kindness, justice, or discretion.-Mekonkey's Appeal,
342
7. Devise to the "M
Methodist and Presbyterian Foreign Missionary Societies." At the testator's death, there was no corporation of the former
name; but the "Missionary Society of The Methodist Episcopal Church,"
was subsequently incorporated, whose objects, as stated by its charter, was
"to diffuse more generally the blessings of educatiom, civilization, and
christianity throughout the United States and elsewhere. Held, that this
society could not take; and per SEaDEN, J., that it was not a "Foreign
Missionary Society," under the terms of the devise.
8. The "Trustees of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church
in the United States," were incorporated in 1799, and authorized to take
by devise, prior to the testator's death, the corporation duly constituted an
agency or board, styled the "Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church, &c.," which was the only Foreign Missionary Society in body
of that church in existence, at the time. Held, that this Board were incompetent to take in itself, and that a devise to it was not a devise to the
"Trustees of the General Assembly."--Chittenden vs. Chittenden,
538
9. Where a man, who was by profession a mariner, made his will in the
Delaware River on board a steamer, which was towing down said river a
vessel in which he was to sail as a passenger to Chagres, there to take
command of a lighter to lighten vessels arriving in the river, it was held
that the will was not within the exception in favor of mariners at sea, the
testator being at the time of its execution a passenger and not a mariner
in service, and being on his way to engage in a business, which was not
that of a mariner at sea.-Warren et al. vs. Harding,
408
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WITNESS.
Under the Statute of Ohio, of March, 1850, which provides that "no
person offered as a witness shall be excluded by reason of his or her interest
in the event of the action; but this section shall not apply to a party to
the action, nor to any party for whose immediate benefit such action is
prosecuted or defended, &c." Directors and Stockholders of a Bank are
competent witnesses for the Corporation, in a suit to which it is a party..
.
. 617
.
Lawson vs. Farmers Bank of Salem,
WORDS OF RECOMMENDATION, &c.
See Will.

